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Case No. 20030496-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from two convictions for attempted exploitation of a minor, both 
third degree felonies, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5a-3 (2003). This Court has 
jurisdiction under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Is defendant entitled to reversal of his conditional guilty pleas where he fails to 
attack the trial court's primary ground for denying his motion to suppress the child 
pornography found on his computer? 
Since defendant does not challenge the basis of the court's ruling below, no 
standard of review applies. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
This appeal does not depend on the interpretation of any constitutional provision, 
statute, or rule. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by Amended Information dated 18 March 2003 with two 
counts of attempted exploitation of a minor, both third degree felonies, in violation of 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5a-3 (2003). R197-196.1 
Defendant's motion to suppress child pornography seized from his computer and 
disks was denied in two written rulings on 4 September 2002, see R139-135, and 20 April 
2003, 5eeR210-208. 
Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to both counts, reserving the right to 
challenge the trial court's ruling. R195-188. The trial court imposed the statutory term of 
0-5 years for each count, which it then suspended and placed defendant a thirty-six month 
term of probation. R222-219. Defendant timely appealed. R224. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The parties stipulated to the following facts, drafted by defense counsel: 
On April 18, 2001, officers went to the home of the defendant. 
Officers approached the defendant at his home. Officers advised [sic] 
asked to look at a computer at the defendant's home. The officers then 
look[ed] at the computer via a program call[ed] wpre-search[.]' [T]he 
officers searched the computer locating what they believed to be 40 images 
of child pornography. They then terminated their search and seized the 
computer. 
The officers then applied for a search warrant by filing an affidavit 
in support of the warrant. See attachment. The affidavit was signed on 24, 
2001. Based on said affidavit, Judge E\re of the Fourth District Court 
signed the search warrant on April 24, 2001. See Search Warrant. 
'The record on appeal has been numbered in reverse chronological order. 
2 
On May 7, 2001, the officers executed the search warrant. On said 
date, the Forensic Computer Lab received the computer and two floppy 
disks from the officer. A bit stream image backup was made of the original 
drive. The backup was then transferred to recordable CDs and marked as 
the original backup. The backup was used to create additional bit stream 
image copies that were used in the forensic examination. This same process 
was used on the floppy disks. 
R68-67 (a copy the stipulation is contained in addendum A). The search warrant affidavit 
by Detective Atack of the Salt Lake City Police Department was attached to the 
stipulation and stated in pertinent part: 
In January of 2000,1 received information from the Dallas Texas 
Police Department that [defendant] of 234 South 800 West, Orem UT 
84058, had purchased access to a web site that distributed child 
pornography with one of his credit cards. 
On April 18, 2001, myself and other members of the Utah Internet 
Crimes Against Children Task Force contacted [defendant] at his residence. 
We identified ourselves to [defendant] and explained to him that we had 
received information that he had purchased access to child pornography on 
the Internet. I informed him that he was not under arrest. I asked 
[defendant] if we could look at his computer to see if he had any child 
pornography stored on it. [Defendant] said "sure, no problem" and led us to 
the computer. Using a program called "Pre-search" we conducted a consent 
search of [defendant's]. During the search I saw approximately 40 images 
of naked children that I believed to be under the age of 12 in various poses 
exposing their genitalia and engaged in sexual activity. After viewing these 
images I terminated the consent search of [defendant's] computer. During 
this consent search, [defendant] stated that the pictures we viewed on his 
computer "seem familiar to one's he's seen over the years/' I seized the 
computer so that a full forensic examination of it could be performed. 
On the basis of the information contained in this affidavit, I believe 
there is probable cause to believe that [defendant] may be a collector of 
child pornography and that there will be additional evidence of this crime 
stored on his computer that was seized. Accordingly, it is requested that 
[the] following items be searched which are located at 257 East 200 South, 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111: 
3 
A personal computer known as a Packard Bell Legend 2440, 
serial number N160095844+. 
Two floppy disks know[n] as Diane's 1.2 MB and Diane's 
720 KB. 
R63-62, add. A. 
Defendant moved to suppress the child pornography found on his computer and 
disks, alleging that they were confiscated without his consent, exigent circumstances, or a 
warrant. R45-43 (a copy is attached in addendum B). The State responded that the 
search and seizure of defendant's computer and disks was justified by defendant's 
voluntary consent. R56-54 (a copy is contained in addendum C). The State further 
argued that seizure of the computer was additionally justified by probable cause and 
exigent circumstances, and that the continuation of the search at the forensic lab was 
additionally justified by the search warrant. R53-52, add. C. 
Thereafter, defendant filed a second motion to suppress asserting that the search 
warrant was not timely executed under UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-23-205 (2003) (wThe 
search warrant shall be served within ten days from the date of issuance. Any search 
warrant not executed within in this time shall be void and shall be returned to the court or 
magistrate as not executed"). R130-128, add. B. 
The State reiterated that the search of defendant's computer and disks—both at his 
home and at the forensic lab—was justified by defendant's voluntary consent which had 
never been withdrawn. R147, add. C. Additionally, the State posited that because police 
possessed defendant's computer pursuant to his consent before they obtained the search 
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warrant it was not necessary to serve defendant with the warrant. R146, add. C. Rather, 
the search warrant was properly and essentially "served" on law enforcement the same 
day it was obtained (24 April 2001) because law enforcement, or the forensic lab, then 
possessed the computer. Id. (citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-23-206 (2003) ("When the 
officer seizes property pursuant to a search warrant, he shall give a receipt to the person 
from whom it was seized or in whose possession it was found. If no person is present, the 
officer shall leave the receipt in the place where he found the property. Failure to give or 
leave a receipt shall not render the evidence seized inadmissible at trial"). 
Even if the warrant was not deemed served until 7 May 2001, the date it was given 
to the forensic lab, the State argued that it was still timely served within the 10-day limit 
set forth in section 77-23-205(2). R145, add. C. Under rule 2, Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays are excluded when computing time 
periods less than eleven days. Id. Thus, excluding weekends, the warrant was served 
nine days after it was issued and was therefore valid. Id. 
Finally, the State argued that police acted in good faith in executing the search 
warrant and that the probable cause supporting the issuance of the warrant had not 
become stale. R145-144, add C. Indeed, the seized computer was kept in a "protected 
environment and was not going to change no matter how long it took for the search.'* 
R144, add. C. Accordingly, even if there was an arguable technical violation of section 
77-23-205(2), defendant suffered no prejudice and suppression was unwarranted. Id. 
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The trial court denied defendant's motions to suppress in a written mling filed on 4 
September 2002: 
. . . The Court is persuaded by [the State's] pleading and authorities 
regarding consensual searches and that such a search is valid if the consent 
was freely and voluntarily given. After review of the parties' pleading and 
authorities the Court concludes that [defendant freely and voluntarily gave 
his permission for the officers to search his computer. Further, no evidence 
has been established of record to show that [defendant later withdrew his 
consent to render a continued search invalid. . . . 
The officers seized the computer on April 18, 2001, taking it into 
their custody but the warrant was not obtained by the officers until April 24, 
2001. The warrant was essentially served on [April] 24, 2001 at the time 
the officers obtained the warrant because the property covered by the 
warrant was in their possession. Therefore, the warrant was served on April 
24, 2001 and not executed until May 7, 2001 when the computer and disks 
were delivered to the forensic lab for search. After review of the statutory 
authorities the Court finds that there is no requirement in [section] 77-23-
205 that requires the authorities who are executing the search upon the 
property to conduct such search within a specific time period. The Court 
concludes that the subsequent forensic search conducted upon the computer 
following it's seizure was a valid search authorized by warrant obtained on 
April 24, 2001. 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court respectfully denies [defendant's 
Motion to Suppress. 
R139-136 (a complete copy of the ruling is attached in addendum D). 
Defendant filed a written Objection to Finding of Fact Referencing Search by 
Consent on 17 March 2003, which stated: 
Defendant objects to any findings suggesting the State had the 
defendant's consent to search his computer or property. The facts in 
support of the motion to suppress were contained within the "Stipulated 
Facts referencing Motion to Suppress." 
No facts were presented to the Court regarding the issue of consent. 
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R182 (a copy is attached in addendum E). Defendant asserted that "all the facts relevant 
to the [m]otion to [s]uppress were contained in the parties' stipulation and the search 
warrant affidavit which he attached to his objection. See R182, 180-174, add. E. 
Defendant also filed a Motion to Strike Court Findings Not Substantiated by Stipulation 
re: Facts on 2 April 2003. R199-198 (a copy is attached as addendum F). Defendant 
argued that the trial court's ruling ''went beyond the facts represented in the stipulation," 
and that the "only factual basis for the Court's ruling (re: motion to suppress) would be 
within the parties' stipulation. No other hearings were conducted regarding the motion to 
suppress and no other evidence exists." Id. The State responded that the trial court's 
voluntary consent ruling was supported by the express language of the parties' stipulation 
which had been drafted by defense counsel. R202-201. The State also pointed out that 
there was no indication in the parties' stipulation that police claimed authority to search 
defendant's computer or disks, exhibited force, used deception or trickery, or that 
defendant objected or otherwise refused to cooperate. R205-204 (citing State v Bisner, 
2001 UT99,<[47, 37P.3dl073). 
The trial court denied defendant's motion to strike in a written ruling filed on 29 
April 2003. R210-208 (a copy is attached in addendum F). The trial court found that the 
parties' stipulation, 
as drafted by [defendant's counsel,. . incorporated' the facts also 
contained within the attachments as well[,] i.e., the Search Warrant and the 
Affidavit for the Search Warrant, as opposed to mere reference to the fact 
that a search warrant was issued which required no such document 
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reference or incorporation. Notably, the Affidavit for Search Warrant 
contains the following language: 
On April 18, 2001, myself (Det. Atack and other members of 
the Utah Internet Crimes Against Children Task Force 
contacted [defendant] at his residence. We identified 
ourselves to [defendant] and explained to him that we had 
received information that he had purchased access to child 
pornography on the Internet. I informed him that he was not 
under arrest. I asked [defendant] if we could look at his 
computer to see if he had any child pornography stored on 
it. [Defendant] said 'sure, no problem9 and led us to the 
computer. Using a program called Tre-search' we 
conducted a consent search of [defendant's] computer. 
During the search I saw approximately 40 images of naked 
children that I believed to be under the age of 12 in various 
poses exposing their genitalia and engaged in sexual activity. 
After viewing these images I terminated the consent search of 
[defendant's] computer. During this consent search, 
[defendant] stated that the pictures we viewed on his 
computer 'seemed familiar to ones he's seen over the years.' 
I seized the computer so that a full forensic examination of it 
could be performed. 
These are the facts known and claimed by the parties at the time the 
stipulation was made relative to the [m]otion to [s]uppress. It is the Court's 
opinion as set forth in its previous [r]uling that notwithstanding 
[defendant's assertions to the contrary, such factual occurrence and the 
circumstances of this case support the conclusion that the search was a 
consensual search. For these reasons and by reason of the authorities and 
arguments set forth in [the State's] memoranda, [defendant's [m]otion is 
respectfully denied. 
R209-208, add. F (emphasis added). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court ruled that the search of defendant's computer and disks for child 
pornography—both at his home and at the forensic lab—was based on defendant's 
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voluntary consent. The trial court also found that the seizure of defendant's computer 
was additionally justified by probable cause and exigent circumstances, and that the 
continuation of the search at the forensic lab was additionally justified by the properly 
served search warrant. On appeal, defendant does not address the trial court's consent 
ruling. Instead, defendant argues that the search warrant was not timely served within ten 
days from the date of its issuance under UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-23-305(2) (2003). 
Because defendant does not attack the primary basis of the trial court's ruling, his claim 
fails. 
ARGUMENT 
DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO A REVERSAL OF HIS 
CONDITIONAL GUILTY PLEAS WHERE HE FAILS TO ATTACK 
THE PRIMARY GROUND FOR DENYING HIS MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS THE CHILD PORNOGRAPHY FOUND ON HIS 
COMPUTER 
Defendant claims that the child pornography found on his computer and disks 
should have been suppressed because the search warrant was allegedly not served within 
10 days after it was issued, as required by UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-23-205(2) (2003). Aplt. 
Br. at 6-8. Defendant's argument overlooks that the trial court denied his motion to 
suppress only after finding that the search and seizure of his computer and disks was 
justified under the consent exception to the warrant requirement. See R139-135, add. D; 
R210-208, add. F. Thus, the search warrant here provided no more than an alternative 
ground for the trial court's ruling. Because defendant fails to attack the primary basis for 
the trial court's ruling, his claim necessarily fails. 
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This is a consent search case. The trial court ruled that the search of defendant's 
computer and disks for child pornography—including the initial search at defendant's 
home and the continuation thereof at the forensic lab—was based on defendant's 
voluntary consent. See R139-136, add. D; R210-208, add. F. Alternatively, the trial court 
found that the seizure of defendant's computer and disks was additionally justified by 
probable cause and exigent circumstances, and that the continuation of the search at the 
forensic lab was additionally justified by the subsequently obtained search warrant. Id. 
Defendant does not attack the trial court's consent ruling. His brief does not quote 
the trial court's ruling, mention the consent exception to the warrant requirement, or 
acknowledge that the trial court upheld the search and seizure of his computer and disks 
in reliance upon the consent exception to the warrant requirement. See Aplt. Br. at 6-8. 
Rather, defendant merely argues that a subsequently obtained search warrant for a further 
search of the seized computer at the forensic lab was not executed within the "statutorily 
mandated ten (10) days," and was therefore void. Aplt. Br. at 7. 
Rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, requires that the argument 
portion of appellant's brief "shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant 
with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing any issue not 
preserved in the trial court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the 
record relied on." 
As Utah courts have frequently reiterated, "a reviewing court is entitled to have the 
issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited and is not simply a depository in 
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which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and research." State v. 
Gomez, 2002 UT 120,1j 20, 63 P.3d 72 (quoting State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 
1988) (in turn quoting Williamson v. Opsahl, 416 N.E.2d 783, 784 (111. App. 1981))). 
Thus, when the appellant fails to present any relevant authority, the reviewing court will 
"decline to find it for him." State v. Pritchett, 2003 UT 24, f 12, 69 P.3d 1278 (rejecting 
prosecutorial misconduct challenge). Similarly, u[w]hen a party fails to offer any 
meaningful analysis, [the court will] decline to reach the merits." State v. Garner, 2002 
UT App 234,1[ 12, 52 P.3d 467. An appellant must, in addition to citing cases, "explain 
why . . . the cited cases compel this court to reverse the district court. . ." Id. 
"Utah courts routinely decline to consider inadequately brief arguments/' State v. 
Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 549 (Utah App. 1998) (citing State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 966 
(Utah 1989); State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984); State v. Yates. 834 P.2d 
599, 602 (Utah App. 1992); State v. Price, 827 P.2d 247, 249 (Utah App. 1992)). See 
also State v. Norris, 2001 UT 104, % 28, 48 P.3d 872, cert, denied, 535 U.S. 1062 (2002); 
State v. Sloan, 2003 UT App 170,1f 13, 72 P.3d 138. 
Because defendant fails to attack the basis for the trial court's consent ruling here, 
his challenge is inadequately briefed. Although his brief contains one legal authority, it 
does not explain why the single cited case compels this Court to reverse the trial court's 
consent ruling. Indeed, it does not address or even mention this ground for the trial 
court's ruling. Accordingly, this Court should decline to address defendant's challenge. 
* * * 
ii 
Even if the Court were to address defendant's inadequately briefed claim, he 
cannot prevail. Assuming the warrant was technically invalid under section 77-23-
205(2), the warrant only went to the continuation of the search at the forensic lab. See 
R65-62, add. A. Defendant fails to argue, let alone to demonstrate that the arguably, 
technically invalid warrant for the forensic lab search compels suppression of the 40 child 
pornography images earlier observed by police on defendant's computer at his home 
pursuant to his voluntary consent. Id. See State v. Genovesi, 909 P.2d 916, 922-924 
(Utah App. 1995) (finding admission of illegally seized evidence harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt where evidence was cumulative of properly admitted evidence). Further, 
a technical statutory violation does not necessarily warrant suppression, particularly 
where as here, defendant makes no claim that the alleged statutory violation amounted to 
a constitutional deprivation or rendered probable cause to search stale. See State v. Ribe, 
876 P.2d 403, 406 (Utah App. 1994) (recognizing that suppression of evidence 'is an 
appropriate remedy for illegal police conduct only when that conduct implicates a 
fundamental violation of a defendant's rights"). See also State v. Miller, 429 N.W.2d 26, 
34-35 (S.D. 1988) (holding that South Dakota's "ten-day rule is not a matter of 
constitutional dimensions, as neither the Fourth Amendment nor [the state constitution] 
contain such a limit," and refusing to suppress even though the ten-day rule was broken 
absent a showing of staleness). 
12 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's third-degree felony convictions for attempted sexual exploitati 
minor should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted on j]_ February 2004. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
MARIAN DECKER 
Assistant Attorney General 
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On April 18, 2001, officers went to the home of the defendant. Officers 
approached the defendant at his home. Officers advised asked to look at a 
computer at the defendant's home. The officers then look at the computer via a 
program call 'pre-search' the officers searched the computer locating what they 
believed to be 40 images of child pornography. They then terminated their 
search and seized the computer. 
The officers then applied for a search warrant bv filing an affidavit in 
support of the warrant See attachment The affidavit was signed on April 24, 
2001 Based on said affidavit, Judge Evre of the Fourth District Court signed the 
search warrant on April 24, 2001 See Search Warrant 
On Mav 7, 2001, the officers executed the search warrant On said date, 
the Forensic Computer Lab received the computer and two floppy disks from the 
officer A bit stream image backup was made of the original hard drive The 
backup was then transferred to recordable CDs and marked as the original 
backup The backup was used to create additional bit stream image copies that 
were used in the forensic examination This same process was used on the 
floppy disks 
Dated t h i s ^ / ^ a y of A r t i s t , 2002 
raula Houston 
For the Attorney General for the State of Utah 
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IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SEARCH WARRANT 
No. 
To any peace officer in the State of Utah: 
Proof by Affidavit under oath having been made this day before me by Detective Ryan 
Atack, I am satisfied that there is probable cause to believe that on the premises known 
as: 
Internet Crimes Against Children Task Force Office, 257 East 200 South, Salt Lake 
City, UT, 84111. 
In the City of Salt Lake, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, there is now certain 
property or evidence described as: 
A personal computer, known as a Packard Bell Legend 2440, serial number 
N160095844 + . 
Two floppy disks, known as Diane's 1.2MB and Diane's 720KB. 
And that said property, which was seized by the Internet Crimes Against Children Task 
Force, was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed; or has been used to commit 
or conceal a public offense; or is being possessed with the purpose to use it as a means 
of committing or concealing a public offense and consists of an item or constitutes 
evidence of illegal conduct possessed by a party to the illegal conduct. 
You are therefore commanded in the daytime, to make a search of the above described 
items for the herein-above described property or evidence and if you find the same or 
>M1TJ* 
any part thereof, to bring it before me at the Fourth District Court, County of Utah, 
State of Utah, or retain such property in your custody, subject to the order of this court. 
GIVEN UNDER MY HAND and dated this 2& t day of April, 2001. 
Judge 
Fourth District Court 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
I, Detective Ryan Atack, under oath state 
1 I am a Detective with the Salt Lake City police department I have been a police 
officer for 9 years and am currently assigned to the Utah Internet Crimes Against Children 
Task Force My current assignment is that of investigating the sexual exploitation of children 
by means of the Internet I have attended the Fox Valley Technical College protecting children 
on-line course I have also attended the Western States Vice Conference, the National 
Consortium for Justice Information and Statistics On-line Investigation course, and the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation Innocent Images course I have investigated several cases involving 
the sexual exploitation of children over the Internet 
2 This affidavit is made in support of an application for a warrant to search a computer 
which I have seized from Paul Sorensen The computer is a Packard Bell Legend 2440, serial 
number N160095844+ I seized the computer on Apnl 18, 2001 and it is being stored at the Utan 
Internet Crimes against Children Task Force Office located at 257 East 200 South, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84111 This affidavit has been reviewed by Jason P Perry, Assistant Ulah Attorney 
General 
3 In January of 2000, I received information from the Dallas Texas Police 
Department that Paul Sorensen of 234 South 800 Webt Orem, UT 84058, had purchased 
access to a web site that distributed child pornographv with one of his credit cards 
4 On April 18, 2001, myself and other members of the Utah Internet Crimes 
Against Children Task Force contacted Paul Sorensen at his residence We identified 
ourselves to Mr Sorensen and explained to him that we had received information that he had 
purchased access to child pornography on the Internet I informed him that he was not under 
arrest I asked Mr Sorensen if we could look at his computer to see if he had any child 
pornography stored on it. Mr. Sorensen said "sure, no problem" and led us to the computer. 
Using a program called "Pre-search" we conducted a consent search of Mr. Sorensen's 
computer. During the search I saw approximately 40 images of naked children that I believed 
to be under the age of 12 in various poses exposing their genitalia and engaged in sexual 
activity. After viewing these images I terminated the consent search of Mr. Sorensen's 
computer. During this consent search, Mr. Sorensen stated that the pictures we viewed on his 
computer u seem familiar to ones he's seen over the years". I seized the computer so that a full 
forensic examination of it could be preformed. 
6. On the basis of the information contained in this affidavit, I believe there is probable 
cause to believe that Paul Sorensen may be a collector of child pornography and that there will 
be additional evidence of this crime stored on his computer that was seized. Accordingly, it is 
requested that following items be searched which are located at 257 East 200 South, Salt Lake 
City, UT 84111: 
A personal computer known as a Packard Bell Legend 2440, serial number 
N160095844+. 
Two Floppy disks know as Diane's 1.2 MB and Diane's 720 KB 
'Elective Ryan Atack a  
Utah Internet Crimes Against Children Task Force 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this /J-f day of April, 2001. 
t 
Fourth District Court 
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SHELDEN R CARTER (0589) 
HARRIS & CARTER 
Attornev for Defendant 
3325 North University.. Suite 200 
Pro\o. Utah 84604-4438 
Telephone: 375-9801 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICAL DISTRICT COURT 
STATE OF UTAH. UTAH COUNTY 
—ooOoo— 
(MOTION TO SUPPRESS & 
STATE OF UTAH. ) MEMORANDUM: 
) PROBABLE CAUSE RE: 
Plaintiff, ) SEARCH WARRANT 
vs. ) 
) TYi3!CN#_. 
) CASE NO. 011403460 




Defendant herein seeks this Court to suppress evidence. Defendant asserts that 
officers herein took, confiscated and search his property. The defendant asserts that such 
was done without warrant and without consent to search the data contained within said 
computer. The defendant asserts that the officers did so without a warrant when a warrant 
was necessitated. 
The defendant asserts that such conduct is a violation of the rights guaranteed to 
him under Art. I Section 14 of the Utah State Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution. 
.1 
FACTS 
The defendant is accused of \iolating the provisions of section 76-5a-3. The basis 
of the accusation i> that the defendant had on a computer images of child pornography. 
At the preliminarv hearing heard on Mav 30, 2002. the officer advised that thev went to 
the defendant's home on April 18, 2001 and entered the home. The officer advised that 
thev conducted a search of a computer in the defendant's home. After viewing the data 
on the computer, the officers then seized the computer. The officers then adv ised that 
thev took the computer from the home and search the contents within said computer. The 
officer advised that such was done without warrant. 
Memorandum 
Presumptions and Burden of Proof. This search is presumptively unreasonable 
since no search warrant authorized a search. State v. Brown. 853 P.2d 851. 855 (Utah 
1992) (citing Katzv. United States, 389 U.S. 347. 357. 88 S. Ct. 507. 514, 19 L. Ed. 2d 
576 (1967)). The State must demonstrate "that the circumstances of rhe seizure constitute 
an exception to the warrant requirement" to avoid exclusion of the evidence from trial. 
State v. Stricklinu. 844 P.2d 979, 985 (Utah App. 1992): See also State v. Christensen. 
676 P.2d 408. 41 1 (Utah 1984) ("Since the officers had no warrant, it was the burden of 
the State to show that the search was lawful."). 
Exigent Circumstances: 
Exigent circumstances exist "onlv when the inevitable dela\ incident to obtaining 
a warrant must give wav to an urgent need for immediate action." United States v. 
Satterfield. 743 P.2d 827. 844 (11th Cir. 1984). Utah courts have identified several 
exigent circumstances that may justif\ a warrantless search, including the immediate need 
to prevent harm to the officers, destruction of evidence, or escape of the suspect. State \. 
Ashe. 745 P.2d 1255. 1258 (Utah 1987): Citv of Orem \. Henrie. 868 P.2d 1384. 1388 
(Utah App. 1994): State \. Belgard. 840 P.2d 816. 823 (Utah App. 1992): State \. Palmer. 
803 P.2d 1249. 1252 (Utah App. 1990). cert, denied. 815 P.2d241 (Utah 1991). "The 
determination of exigencv is based on the totality of the circumstances." Henrie. 868 P.2d 
at 1388. 
Defendant asserts that the officers lack anv need warranting immediate action. 
More than adequate time existed for the officers to obtain a search warrant. The) simply 
needed to make application and obtain the Court's approval prior to searching the interior 
of the computer. Defendant asserts that no exigent circumstances existed justifying such 
an immediate search of the contents of the computer. 
CONCLUSION 
The officer herein conducted a search of the computer without judicial 
authorization. The onlv justification for such a search would be exigent circumstance and 
none existed here. 
This ev idence must be suppressed. 
Dated this 18lhdav ofJulv.2002. 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby- certify that I hand delivered a copy of the foregoing to: 
ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
236 State Capitol 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84111 
Postage prepaid this JJ_ day of July 2002. 
lifadu (%\L=. 
Secretary 
n 1 ; 
2902 AUG 3 0 PM
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SHELDEN R CARTER (0589) 
HARRIS & CARTER 
Attorney for Defendant 
3325 N. University Ave., Ste. 200 
Jamestown Square, Clocktower Bldg. 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: 375-9801 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY 
—oooOooo— 
STATE OF UTAH, 
2nd Memorandum in Support of 
Motion to Suppress 





On April 18, 2001, officers went to the home of the defendant. Officers 
approached the defendant at his home. Officers advised asked to look at a 
computer at the defendant's home. The officers then look at the computer via a 
program call 'pre-search' the officers searched the computer locating what they 
believed to be 40 images of child pornography. They then terminated their 
search and seized the computer. 
The officers then applied for a search warrant by filing an affidavit in 
support of the warrant. See attachment. The affidavit was signed on April 24, 
2001. Based on said affidavit Judge Eyre of the Fourth District Court signed the 
search warrant on April 24, 2001. See Search Warrant. 
On May 7, 2001, the officers executed the search warrant. On said date, 
the Forensic Computer Lab received the computer and two floppy disks from the 
officer. A bit stream image backup was made of the original hard drive. The 
backup was then transferred to recordable CDs and marked as the original 
backup. The backup was used to create additional bit stream image copies that 
were used in the forensic examination. This same process was used on the 
floppy disks. 
Memorandum 
The State law dealing with the issuance of search warrants is set out by the 
provisions of Title 77 Chapter 23. The time for service of such warrants is limited 
by statute to ten days after issuance. The provisions provides as follows: 
77-23-205. Time for service Officer may request assistance. 
(1) The rragistrate shall .^ser: a direction in tne ^arrant 
that it be served in the daytime, ^n^ess tne affidavits or oral 
testimony state a reasonable ca_.se to believe a search ^s 
necessary m the night to seize tne property prior to it being 
concealed, destroyed, damaged, altered, or for otner good 
reason; in which case he may insert a direction that it oe 
served any tire of the day or ^gnt. An officer may request 
other persons to assist hi^ m conducting the search. 
_PAG 
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(2) The search warrant shall be served within ten days from 
the date of issuance. Any search warrant not executed within 
this time shall be void and shall be returned to the court or 
magistrate as not executed. 
Defendant argues that the Court signed the warrant on April 24, 2001. 
Not counting the 24th, the warrant should have been executed by May 4, 2001. 
The officers executed the search warrant on May 7, 2001. 
By law, the warrant was void after May 4. The warrant was stale and 
void by statutory definition. Statutorily the warrant was to be returned to the 
Court or magistrate and not executed. The officers herein failed to comply with 
the mandated period of the statute. 
Defendant's motion to suppress should be granted. 
Dated this day of August, 2002. 
Sheldon Carter 




I hereby cet tif> that I faxed a copy of the foregoing Motion and Objection. 
Attorney General on the 
On this 30 th day of August. 2002. 
N* * 
Addendum C 
CRAIG L. BARLOW, 0213 
PAULA J. HOUSTON. 5239 
JASON P. PERRY, 8663 
Assistant Attorneys General 
MARK SHURTLEFF, 4666 
Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801)538-1941 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE 
TO DEFENDANTS MOTION 
Plaintiff, TO SUPPRESS 
vs. : 
PAUL HARVEY SORENSEN, : Case No. 011403460 FS 
: Judge Stott 
Defendant. 
The State through its counsel, Paula J. Houston, Assistant Attorney General, submits this 
Memorandum in Response to Defendant's Motion to Suppress. Defendant's motion should be 
denied because the defendant's home computer was searched only after the defendant consented 
to the search. After the computer was seized, a forensic search of the computer was done 
pursuant to a search warrant. Therefore, these actions did not violate the Fourth Amendment of 
5I/G / J L ? 
the United States Constitution, nor Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On April 18, 2001, Detective Atack, an officer with the Salt Lake City Police Department 
assigned to the Internet Crimes Against Children Task Force (ICAC), with several other 
members of ICAC, contacted the defendant at his home. Detective Atack explained to the 
defendant that he had received information that the defendant had purchased access to child 
pornography on the Internet. He asked the defendant if they could look at his computer to see if 
he had any child pornography on it. The defendant gave Detective Atack consent to search his 
computer, and led them to the room where his computer was located. A consent search was 
conducted on the defendant's computer. During this search, Detective Atack observed several 
images of nude children engaged in sexual acts. The defendant was present during the search 
and commented on the pictures. After finding the images, Detective Atack ended the consent 
search and seized the computer for a full forensic examination. No additional search was made 
of the computer until a search warrant, signed by Judge Donald Eyre, was obtained on Apnl 24, 
2001, authorizing the complete search of the computer and two floppy disks. The forensic 
examination revealed many image files of children engaged in sexual conduct. 




Searches which are authorized by consent are "wholly valid". Katz v. United States, 389 
U.S. 347 (1967). This principle has been upheld repeatedly since Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 
412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) where the United States Supreme Court stated that it is "well settled 
that one of the specifically established exceptions to the requirements of both a warrant and 
probable cause is a search that is conducted pursuant to consent." (See also Davis v. United 
States. 328 U.S. 582, 593-594, Vale v. Louisiana, 26 L.Ed.2d 409, Katz at 389). In order for a 
consent search to be valid, the consent must be freely and voluntanly given. See Bumber v. North 
Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968). This is a question of fact, and it must be determined from 
the totality of the circumstances. See Schneckloth at 227. 
In this case, Agent Rose testified at the preliminary hearing that he went to the 
defendant's home with other ICAC members. The defendant opened the door. They explained 
that in January 2000, ICAC received information from the Dallas Texas Police Department that 
the defendant had used his credit card to purchase access to a web site that distributed child 
pornography. They asked the defendant if they could look at his computer and descnbed the 
search program they would use on his computer. The defendant freely and voluntanly consented 
to the officers entering his home and searching his computer. He took them to the computer, 
which was located in his bedroom, and watched as the officers searched his computer. The 
defendant did not with draw his consent at any time dunng this search. Based on the consent 
doctrine, this search did not violate the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, nor 
3 
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Article I, Section-14 of the Utah Constitution. 
II. SEIZURE OF THE COMPUTER WAS VALID BECAUSE OF PLAIN 
VIEW AND EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES 
The United States Supreme Court has ruled that ,;while lawfully engaged in an activity in 
a particular place, police officers perceive a suspicious object, they may seize it immediately." 
Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 739 (1983). They also stated that "[w]hat a person knowingly 
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment 
protection." See Katz at 351. If an individual is invited into a home and does not exceed the 
scope of the invitation, he may seize anything in plain view. State v. McArthur, 996 P.2d 555, 
562 (Utah App. 2000). 
During the consent search in this case, numerous images of nude children engaged in 
sexual acts were found on the defendant's computer. The defendant was not under arrest nor was 
he being removed from the home. The officers were in a place they had a legal right to be, based 
on the consent of the defendant, conducting a search they had a legal right to conduct. Upon 
seeing the images of nude children engaged in sexual acts, the officers had probable cause to 
believe those pictures where illegal. They seized the computer as evidence in plain view and 
based on exigent circumstances. Because computer images are easily destroyed and because it is 
easy to move a personal computer, it was reasonable for the officers to believe the defendant 
would destroy or hide the evidence if they did not seize the computer immediately. Citvof Orem 
4 
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v Henne, 868 P.2d 1384 (Utah App. 1994); State v. Belgard. 840 P.2d 819 (Utah App 1992); 
State v. Palmer. 803 P.2d 1249 (Utah App. 1990), cert, denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991). The 
seizure of the computer did not violate the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, 
nor Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. 
III. THE FORENSIC SEARCH WAS V \LID BECAUSE IT WAS PURSUANT 
TO A SEARCH WARRANT 
Once the computer was seized, a search warrant was obtained before any additional 
searches were conducted on the computer. The warrant was signed by Judge Donald Eyre on 
April 24, 2001, authorizing the complete search of the computer and two floppy disks which 
were seized from the defendant. A copy of the search warrant was sent to the defense as part of 
discovery. (See, Search Warrant, bate stamp 00000002-0000000.) 
CONCLUSION 
As the court noted in Schneckloth "in some situations where the police have some 
evidence of illicit activity, but lack probable cause to arrest or search, a search authorized by a 
valid consent may be the only means of obtaining important and reliable evidence." (Schneckloth 
at 288). Such is the case at hand, ICAC received information that the defendant's credit card 
was used to purchased access to an Internet website that distnbuted child pornography and went 
to the defendant's home to investigate that information. In the process, the defendant 
5 
consented to let the officers search his computer for such matenal. The defendant's consent was 
voluntary and the evidence that was obtained from that consent should be admitted at tnal. The 
subsequent forensic search was conducted under a duly authonzed search warrant and all 
evidence obtained as a result of that search should also be admitted at tnal. 
DATED this 16th day of August, 2002. 
MARK SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General / 
v m 
Paula J. Hoi/ston 
Assistant Attorney General 
6 
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Certificate of Service 
I hereby certify that on this day of August, 2002, I mailed a true and correct copv 
of the above Memorandum in Response to Defendants Motion to Suppress, postage pre-paid, to 
Shelden Carter at 3325 North University, Suite 200, Provo, UtaK84604-4438. 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SEARCH WARRANT 
No. 
To any peace officer in the State of Utah: 
Proof by Affidavit under oath having been made this day before me by Detective Ryan 
Atack, I am satisfied that there is probable cause to believe that on the premises known 
as: 
Internet Crimes Against Children Task Force Office, 257 East 200 South, Salt Lake 
City, UT, 84111. 
In the City of Salt Lake, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, there is now certain 
property or evidence described as: 
A personal computer, known as a Packard Bell Legend 2440, serial number 
N160095844+. 
Two floppy disks, known as Diane's 1.2MB and Diane's 720KB. 
And that said property, which was seized by the Internet Crimes Against Children Task 
Force, was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed; or has been used to commit 
or conceal a public offense; or is being possessed with the purpose to use it as a means 
of committing or concealing a public offense and consists of an item or constitutes 
evidence of illegal conduct possessed by a party to the illegal conduct. 
You are therefore commanded in the daytime, to make a search of the above described 
items for the herein-above described property or evidence and if you find the same or 
any part thereof, to bring it before me at the Fourth District Court, County of Utah, 
State of Utah, or retain such property in your custody, subject to the order of this court. 
GIVEN UNDER MY HAND and dated this '/>f _ day of April, 2001. 2it 
Judge 
Fourth District Court 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
I, Detective Ryan Atack, under oath state: 
1. I am a Detective with the Salt Lake City police department. I have been a police 
officer for 9 years and am currently assigned to the Utah Internet Crimes Against Children 
Task Force. My current assignment is that of investigating the sexual exploitation of children 
by means of the Internet. I have attended the Fox Valley Technical College protecting children 
on-line course. I have also attended the Western States Vice Conference, the National 
Consortium for Justice Information and Statistics On-line Investigation course, and the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation Innocent Images course. I have investigated several cases involving 
the sexual exploitation of children over the Internet. 
2. This affidavit is made in support of an application for a warrant to search a computer 
which I have seized from Paul Sorensen. The computer is a Packard Bell Legend 2440, serial 
number N160095844+-. I seized the computer on April 18, 2001 and it is being stored at the Utah 
Internet Crimes against Children Task Force Office located at 257 East 200 South, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84111. This affidavit has been reviewed by Jason P. Perry, Assistant Utah Attorney 
General. 
3. In January of 2000, I received information from the Dallas Texas Police 
Department that Paul Sorensen of 234 South 800 West, Orem, UT 84058, had purchased 
access to a web site that distributed child pornography with one of his credit cards. 
4. On April 18, 2001, myself and other members of the Utah Internet Crimes 
Against Children Task Force contacted Paul Sorensen at his residence. We identified 
ourselves to Mr. Sorensen and explained to him that we had received information that he had 
purchased access to child pornography on the Internet. I informed him that he was not under 
arrest. I asked Mr. Sorensen if we could look at his computer to see if he had any child 
pornography stored on it. Mr. Sorensen said "sure, no problem" and led us to the computer. 
Using a program called "Pre-search" we conducted a consent search of Mr. Sorensen's 
computer. During the search I saw approximately 40 images of naked children that I believed 
to be under the age of 12 in various poses exposing their genitalia and engaged in sexual 
activity. After viewing these images I terminated the consent search of Mr. Sorensen's 
computer. During this consent search, Mr. Sorensen stated that the pictures we viewed on his 
computer " seem familiar to ones he's seen over the years". I seized the computer so that a full 
forensic examination of it could be preformed. 
6. On the basis of the information contained in this affidavit, I believe there is probable 
cause to believe that Paul Sorensen may be a collector of child pornography and that there will 
be additional evidence of this crime stored on his computer that was seized. Accordingly, it is 
requested that following items be searched which are located at 257 East 200 South, Salt Lake 
City, UT 84111: 
A personal computer known as a Packard Bell Legend 2440, serial number 
N160095844+. 
Two Floppy disks know as Diane's 1.2 MB and Diane's 720 KB 
Detective Ryan Atack 
Utah Internet Crimes Against Children Task Force 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this /Ji day of April, 2001. 1 
Fourth District Court 
,> 
CRAIG L. BARLOW, 0213 
PAULA J. HOUSTON. 5239 
JASON P. PERRY, 8663 
Assistant Attorneys General 
MARK SHURTLEFF, 4666 
Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801)538-1941 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE 
TO DEFENDANTS 2nd MOTION 
Plaintiff, TO SUPPRESS 
vs. : 
PAUL HARVEY SORENSEN, : Case No. 011403460 FS 
: Judge Fred D. Howard 
Defendant. 
The State through its attorney, Paula J. Houston, Assistant Attorney General, submits this 
Memorandum in Response to Defendant's 2nd Motion to Suppress. Defendant's motion should 
be denied because the search warrant was "served" immediately upon receipt even though the lab 
did not receive the computer until nine days after the issuance of the search warrant pursuant to 
the procedures for computing time as outlined in Rule 2 of the Criminal Rules of Procedure. 
tfUurtiCcunty.Sis::-
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On April 18, 2001, Detective Atack, an officer with the Salt Lake City Police Department 
assigned to the Internet Crimes Against Children Task Force (ICAC), with several other 
members of ICAC, contacted the defendant at his home, entered the home with consent of the 
defendant, searched his computer, and then seized it when sexually explicit images of children 
were found on the computer. At no time did the defendant withdraw his consent. Detective 
Atack obtained a search warrant on April 24, 2001 which authorized a search of the computer 
and two disks. The computer and the disks were transported to the lab May 7, 2001, thirteen 
calendar days after the warrant was issued. Four of those days were weekend days. 
I. CONSENT 
At stated in the first memorandum, searches which are authorized by consent are "wholly 
valid." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) This principle has been upheld repeatedly 
since Schneckloth v Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) where the United States Supreme 
Court stated that it is "well settled that one of the specifically established exceptions to the 
requirements of both a warrant and probable cause is a search that is conducted pursuant to 
consent." A consent search must be freely and voluntanly given. See Bumber v. North Carolina, 
391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968). The person giving their consent has a nght to withdraw their consent 
at anytime. As of this date, the defendant has not withdrawn his consent to his computer and 
disks being searched. Based on the consent doctnne, the forensic search did not violate the 
? 
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, nor Article I, Section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution. 
II. TIME FOR SERVICE OF A SEARCH WARRANT 
Section 77-23-205(2) states a ''search warrant shall be served within ten days from the 
date of issuance." The defendant argues that the w arrant was executed on May 7, 2001. In 
addition, the defendant says it should have been served no later than May 4, 2001 and was void 
after that date, this argument raises two issues: when is a warrant "served" and how do you 
compute the time for serving a search warrant. 
1. WHEN IS A WARRANT "SERVED?" 
Typically a warrant is "served" when it is handed to the home owner as the officer 
explains their nght to enter the home and search it or when the officers force entry into the home. 
Service is not as clear when the officers have the object to be searched in their possession. In the 
case at issue, the officers obtained a search warrant for the defendant's computer and disks which 
they already had in their possession. They considered the warrant "served" on themselves when 
they returned to the office because they were the individuals "in whose possession it was found/' 
Section 77-23-206. The computer and disks were transported to the lab for analysis on May 7, 
2001. Nothing in Section 77-23-205 requires the search itself to be completed within any certain 
time period. Forensic searches at the lab often take days and even months depending on the case 
load at the time the search is requested. 
3 
2. HOW DO YOU COMPUTE THE TIME FOR SERVING A SEARCH 
WARRANT? 
If the court decides that the warrant was ^served" on May 7, 2001, the date it was given to 
the lab, then the question is how do you compute the time for serving a search warrant Section 
77-1-2 states 'The procedure in cnminal cases shall be as prescnbed in this title, the Rules of 
Cnminal Procedures, and such further rules as may be adopted by the Supreme Court of Utah " 
So, in addition to Section 77-23-205, the court must consider the Rules of Cnminal Procedure 
because Rule 2 specifically sets out the procedure for computing penods of time. Cr P. Rule 2 
says that if the time penod is less than 11 days, Saturdays, Sundays, and legal hohdavs are not 
counted. Because the time set out in Section 77-23-205 is 10 days, Cr. P. Rule 2 requires 
Saturdays and Sundays to be excluded from the penod. Using the dates argued by the defendant, 
Apnl 24, 2001 to May 7, 2001, two Saturdays and two Sundays occur. When those days are 
subtracted from the time penod, the warrant was served nine days after it was issued. Therefore, 
it was valid on the date it was served making the search a legally authonzed search. 
EXTENSION OF TIME 
Cr. P. Rule 2 allows the court for cause shown, at any time in its discretion, including 
after the expiration of the specified penod, to "permit the act to be done if there was a reasonable 
excuse for the failure to act." The State hereby moves the court to extend the time penod for the 
search warrant to allow the search that was conducted in May 2001. The officers acted in 
good faith in administenng this warrant. The evidence which was the basis for the probable 
4 
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cause was not becoming stale The evidence was in a protected environment and was not going to 
change no matter how long it took for the search The defendant was not harmed or 
inconvenienced as a result of search If the officers violated the ten-day rule, it was a technical 
violation that did not violate the spirit of the law 
CONCLUSION 
The forensic search was conducted under consent and a duly authorized search warrant 
and all evidence obtained as a result of that search should be admitted at trial If there was a 
violation of the ten-day rule, it was not a substantial violation pursuant to Section 77-23-212 and 
therefore the motion to suppress should be denied. 
s-W, DATED th is -^^dav of September, 2002 
MARK SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
Paula J Houston 
Assistant Attorney General 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, and faxed a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S 2nd MOTION TO SUPPRESS to: 
SHELDON CARTER 
HARRIS & CARTER 
3325 N University Ave, STE 200 
Provo, UT 84604 
(801)377-1149 (Fax) 
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RULING Re: DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Case No 011403460 
Honorable Fred D Howard 
District Court Judge 
The above-entitled matter having come before the court on Defendant's Motion to 
Suppress, and the court having reviewed the Motion and Plaintiffs Response thereto, the court 
being fully advised in the premises, and good cause appearing, it now makes the following ruling 
RULING 
The matter before the Court arises from Defendant's Motion to Suppress evidence On 
April 18, 2001, Detective Atack, an officer with the Salt Lake City Police Department assigned to 
the Internet Crimes Against Children Task Force (ICAC), with other members of ICAC, 
contacted Defendant at his home. Detective Atack explained to Defendant that ICAC had 
received information that Defendant had purchased access to child pornography on the Internet 
After this initial contact with him, Defendant was asked if the detectives might look at his 
1 
computer regarding evidence of child pornography Defendant consented to the request and led 
the investigators to the bedroom where the computer was located The detectives searched then 
seized the computer 
On July 19, 2002, Defendant filed his Motion to Suppress Plaintiff filed it's Response on 
August 16, 2002 Defendant asserts that Detective Atack and other officers unreasonably 
searched and seized his computer for evidence of child pornography, and, therefore, the evidence 
should be suppressed Plaintiff asserts that the detectives advised Defendant of the information 
they had received regarding possible child pornography, and that they asked for and received 
permission to look at his computer, and as such, the search was a consensual search that does not 
violate the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution The Court is persuaded by 
Plaintiffs pleading and authonties regarding consensual searches and that such a search is valid if 
the consent was freely and voluntarily given After review of the parties' pleadings and 
authorities the Court concludes that Defendant freely and voluntarily gave his permission for the 
officers to search his computer Further, no evidence has been established of record to show that 
Defendant later withdrew his consent to render a continued search invalid 
Defendant also asserts that seizure of the computer was invalid because the search of the 
computer was done illegally Having determined that the search conducted by the detectives on 
Defendant's computer was reasonable and valid, the officers' subsequent seizure of the computer 
was legal when they thereafter were able to view images which ostensibly would be characterized 
2 
as child pornography. The seizure was also justified since the Defendant might destroy or conceal 
the computer data evidence on the computer while the officers sought a search warrant. 
Finally, Plaintiff asserts that the search warrant obtained on April 24, 2001, was properly 
served on the possessors of the property to be searched. U.C.A. § 77-23-205(2) regarding search 
warrant service states, "a search warrant shall be served within ten days from the date of 
issuance." Defendant asserts that the warrant was executed on May 7, 2001, however, it should 
have been served no later than May 4, 2001, or it became void. The Court is not persuaded by 
Defendant's argument. The Court notes that service and execution of the warrant are separate 
issues that are often mistaken as one in the same because usually the warrant is served and 
executed simultaneously. The officers seized the computer on April 18, 2001, taking it into their 
custody but the warrant was not obtained by the officers until April 24, 2001. The warrant was 
essentially served on May 24, 2001 at the time the officers obtained the warrant because the 
property covered by the warrant was in their possession. Therefore, the warrant was served on 
April 24, 2001 and not executed until May 7, 2001 when the computer and disks were delivered 
to the forensic lab for search. After review of the statutory authorities the Court finds that there 
is no requirement in U.C.A. § 77-23-205 that requires the authorities who are executing the 
search upon the property to conduct such search within a specific time period. The Court 
concludes that the subsequent forensic search conducted upon the computer following it's seizure 
was a valid search authorized by warrant obtained on April 24, 2001. 
3 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court respectfully denies Defendant's Motion to Suppress 
DATED this ^ / day of September, 2002 
BY THE COURT ^ >>S£&$/ 
I ' * V E ' J 
,'? 
*^% a : 3 Honorable Fred D K c r \ ^ ^ ^ T I ^ / s 
District Court Judge ' . ^ "*"* ^ V 
4 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of tt»e foregoing was mailed to the following, 
postage prepaid, on this -*-f day of September 2002' 
Sheldon R. Carter 
HARRIS & CARTER 
3325 N University Ave., Suite 200 
Jamestown Square, Clocktower Building 




ksastasa. kstovas^s CtewereA. 
Mark ShurtlerT 
Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
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Addendum E 
F. G V G L : 
K33 i:: .h, 
ftfl 
SHELDEN R. CARTER (0589) 
HARRIS & CARTER 
Attorney for Defendant 
3325 North University Avenue 
Suite 200 
Provo, Utah 84604-4438 
Telephone: 375-9801 
FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DEPT. 
—ooOoo— 





OBJECTION TO FINDING 
OF FACT REFERENCING 
SEARCH BY CONSENT 
Case No: 011403460 fs 
Honorable: Howard 
—ooOoo— 
Defendant objects to any findings suggesting the State had the defendant's 
consent to search his computer or property. The facts in support of the motion to 
suppress were contained within the "Stipulated Facts referencing Motion to 
Suppress." 
No facts were presented to the Court regarding the issue of consent. See 
attachment detailing all the facts relevant to the Motion to Suppress. 
DATED this 17™ day of March, 2003 
SHELDEN R CARTER 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I personally mailed a true and correct copv of 
the foregoing on this • ' day of March, 2003, by first-class, U.S. Mail, postage 
prepaid to the following: 
Paula Houston 
Attorney General for the State of Utah 
236 State Capital 
Salt Lake Citv, Utah 84126-0295 
Secretary 
SHELDEN R CARTER (0589) 
HARRIS & CARTER 
Attorney for Defendant 
3325 N. University Ave., Ste. 200 
Jamestown Square, Clocktower Bldg. 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: 375-9801 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY 
-oooOooo-
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
) Stipulated Facts Referencing 
) Motion to Suppress 
vs. ) 
PAUL SORENSON, ) 
) Crim. No. 011403460 
Defendant. ) 
--000O000 — 
On April 18, 2001, officers went to the home of the defendant. Officers 
approached the defendant at his home. Officers advised asked to look at a 
computer at the defendant's home. The officers then look at the computer via a 
program call 'pre-search' the officers searched the computer locating what they 
believed to be 40 images of child pornography. They then terminated their 
search and seized the computer. 
The officers then applied for a search warrant by filing an affidavit in 
support of the warrant. See attachment. The affidavit was signed on April 24, 
2001. Based on said affidavit, Judge Eyre of the Fourth District Court signed the 
search warrant on April 24, 2001. See Search Warrant. 
On May 7, 2001, the officers executed the search warrant. On said date, 
the Forensic Computer Lab received the computer and two floppy disks from the 
officer. A bit stream image backup was made of the original hard drive. The 
backup was then transferred to recordable CDs and marked as the original 
backup. The backup was used to create additional bit stream image copies that 
were used in the forensic examination. This same process was used on the 
floppy disks. 
Dated this day of August, 2002. 
Paula Houston 
For the Attorney General for the State of Utah 
Dated this day of August, 2002. 
Shelden Carter 




I HEREBY CERTIFY that I personally faxed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing on this day of August, 2002, by first-class, U.S. Mail, postage 
prepaid to the following: 
Hand delivered this day to the Attorney General 
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IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SEARCH YVARRANT 
No. 
To any peace officer in the State of Utah: 
Proof by Affidavit under oath having been made this day before me by Detective Ryan 
Atack, I am satisfied that there is probable cause to believe that on the premises known 
as: 
Internet Crimes Against Children Task Force Office, 257 East 200 South, Salt Lake 
City, UT, 84111. 
In the City of Salt Lake, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, there is now certain 
property or evidence described as: 
A personal computer, known as a Packard Bell Legend 2440, serial number 
N160095844+. 
Two floppy disks, known as Diane's 1.2MB and Diane's 720KB. 
And that said property, which was seized by the Internet Crimes Against Children Task 
Force, was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed; or has been used to commit 
or conceal a public offense; or is being possessed with the purpose to use it as a means 
of committing or concealing a public offense and consists of an item or constitutes 
evidence of illegal conduct possessed by a party to the illegal conduct. 
You are therefore commanded in the daytime, to make a search of the above described 
items for the herein-above described property or evidence and if you find the same or 
any part thereof, to bring it before me at the Fourth District Court, County of Utah, 
State of Utah, or retain such property in your custody, subject to the order of this court. 
GIVEN UNDER MY HAND and dated this 2i if- day of April, 2001. 
Judge 
Fourth District Court 
QOOVVdO'J 
_L I O 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
I, Detective Ryan Atack, under oath state: 
1. I am a Detective with the Salt Lake City police department. I have been a police 
officer for 9 years and am currently assigned to the Utah Internet Crimes Against Children 
Task Force. My current assignment is that of investigating the sexual exploitation of children 
by means of the Internet. I have attended the Fox Valley Technical College protecting children 
on-line course. I have also attended the Western States Vice Conference, the National 
Consortium for Justice Information and Statistics On-line Investigation course, and the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation Innocent Images course. I have investigated several cases involving 
the sexual exploitation of children over the Internet. 
2 This affidavit is made in support of an application for a warrant to search a computer 
which I have seized from Paul Sorensen. The computer is a Packard Bell Legend 2440, serial 
number N160095844+-. I seized the computer on April 18, 2001 and it is being stored at the Utah 
Internet Crimes against Children Task Force Office located at 257 East 200 South, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 8411 i. This affidavit has been reviewed by Jason P. Perry, Assistant Utah Attorney 
General. 
3. In January of 2000, I received information from the Dallas Texas Police 
Department that Paul Sorensen of 234 South 800 West, Orem, UT 84058, had purchased 
access to a web site that distributed child pornography with one of his credit cards. 
4. On April 18, 2001, myself and other members of the Utah Internet Crimes 
Against Children Task Force contacted Paul Sorensen at his residence. We identified 
ourselves to Mr. Sorensen and explained to him that we had received information that he had 
purchased access to child pornography on the Internet. I informed him that he was not under 
arrest. I asked Mr. Sorensen if we could look at his computer to see if he had any child 
pornography stored on it Mr Sorensen said "sure, no problem" and led us to the computer 
Using a program called "Pre-search" we conducted a consent search of Mr Sorensen's 
computer During the search I saw approximately 40 images of naked children that I believed 
to be under the age of 12 in various poses exposing their genitalia and engaged in sexual 
activity After viewing these images I terminated the consent search of Mr Sorensen's 
computer During this consent search, Mr Sorensen stated that the pictures we viewed on his 
computer " seem familiar to ones he's seen over the years" I seized the computer so that a full 
forensic examination of it could be preformed 
6 On the basis of the information contained in this affidavit, I believe there is probable 
cause to believe that Paul Sorensen may be a collector of child pornography and that there will 
be additional evidence of this crime stored on his computer that was seized Accordingly, it i* 
requested that following items be searched which are located at 257 East 200 South, Salt Lake 
City, UT 84111 
A personal computer known as a Packard Bell Legend 2440, serial number 
N160095844+ 
Two Floppy disks know as Diane's 1 2 MB and Diane's 720 KB 
Detective Ryan Atack r 
Utah Internet Crimes Against Children Task Force 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this /J-f day of April, 2001 
Juc 
Fourth District Court 
OOOOOPfi 
- *' I 
4 J H D l S ] [ 
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SHELDEN R CARTER (0589) 
HARRIS & CARTER 
Attorney for Defendant 
3325 North University, Suite 200 
Provo. Utah 84604-4438 
Telephone: 375-9801 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICAL DISTRICT COURT 
STATE OF UTAH. UTAH COUNTY 
—ooOoo— 
MOTION TO STRIKE 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 




BY STIPULATION RE: 
FACTS 
CASE NO. 011403460 
—ooOoo— 
Defendant herein sought to suppress evidence. Defendant asserts that officers 
herein took, confiscated and search his propertv. The defendant asserts that such conduct 
is a violation of the rights guaranteed to him under Art. I Section 14 of the Utah State 
Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
The parties herein stipulated to the facts upon which the Court would rely on the 
motion to suppress. The stipulation was signed bv counsel for both parties and approved 
by this Court. 
The Court's ruling went beyond the facts represented in the stipulation. The 
onlv factual basis for the Court" ruling (re: motion to suppress) would be within the 
parties' stipulation. No other hearings were conducted regarding the motion to suppress 
and no other evidence exists.. 
Based thereon, the defendant motions to limit the factual findings (set out in the 
Court's ruling denying the motion to suppress) to those facts contained within the 
parties' stipulation. 
Dated this 2nd day of April 2003. /^~^\ 
Shekfen Carter X 
Attorney for Defendant Sorensen 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereb> certify that I hand delivered a cop> of the foregoing to: 
ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
236 State Capitol 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 




Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
-I/*/** ' '^-Deputy 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
vs. 
PAUL HARVEY SORENSEN, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
RULING RE: DEFENDANTS 
MOTION TO STRIKE COURT 
FINDINGS NOT SUBSTANTIATED 
BY STIPULATION RE: FACTS 
Case #011403460 
Judge Fred D. Howard 
Division 2 
The above-entitled matter having come before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Strike 
Court Findings Not Substantiated by Stipulation Re: Facts; and the Court having considered the 
Motion and Plaintiffs Response thereto; the Court being fully advised in the premises, and good 
cause appearing, it now makes the following ruling: 
RULING 
The matter before the Court arises from Defendant's Motion to Suppress evidence and the 
Court's previous ruling on the Motion. The Court notes that the parties' Stipulated Facts 
Referencing the Motion to Suppress contains the following language: 
"On April 18, 2001, officers went to the home of the defendant. 
Officers approached the defendant at this home. Officers advised 
asked to look at a computer at the defendant's home. The officers 
then look at the computer via a program call 'pre-search' the officers 
searched the computer locating what they believed to be 40 images of 
child pornography. They then terminated their search and seized the 
computer. 
"The officers then applied for a search warrant by filing an affidavit 
in support of the warrant. See attachment. The affidavit was 
signed on April 24, 2001. Based on said affidavit, Judge Eyre of the 
Fourth District Court signed the search warrant on April 24,2001. 
See Search Warrant. 
"On May 7, 2001, the officers executed the search warrant. On said 
date, the Forensic Computer Lab received the computer and two 
floppy disks from the officer. A bit stream image backup was made 
of the original hard drive. The backup was then transferred to 
recordable CDs and marked as the original backup. The backup was 
used to create additional bit stream image copies that were used in the 
forensic examination. This same process was used on the floppy 
disks." (Emphasis added) 
By use of the above language, as drafted by Defendant's counsel, the parties "incorporated" 
the facts also contained within the attachments as well: i.e., the Search Warrant and the Affidav it for 
Search Warrant, as opposed to the mere reference to the fact that a search warrant was issued which 
required no such document reference or incorporation. Notably, the Affidavit for Search Warrant 
contains the following language: 
"On April 18, 2001, myself and other members of the Utah Internet 
Crimes Against Children Task Force contacted Paul Sorensen at his 
residence. We identified ourselves to Mr. Sorensen and explained to 
him that we had received information that he had purchased access to 
child pornography on the Internet. I informed him that he was not 
under arrest. I asked Mr. Sorensen if we could look at his 
computer to see if he had any child pornography stored on it. 
Mr. Sorensen said 4sure, no problem' and led us to the computer. 
Using a program called Tre-search' we conducted a consent search 
2 
of Mr Sorensen's computer During the search I saw approximately 
40 images of naked children that I believed to be under the age of 12 
in various poses exposing their genitalia and engaged in sexual 
activ lty After viewing theses images I terminated the consent search 
of Mr Sorensen's computer During this consent search, Mr 
Sorensen stated that the pictures we viewed on his computer * seemed 
familiar to ones he's seen over the years ' I seized the computer so 
that a full forensic examination of it could be preformed "' (Emphasis 
added) 
These are the facts known and claimed by the parties at the time the stipulation was made 
relative to the Motion to Suppress It is the Court's opinion as set forth in its previous Ruling that 
notwithstanding Defendant's assertions to the contrary, such factual occurrence and the circum-
stances of this case support the conclusion that the search was a consensual search For these reasons 
and by reason of the authorities and arguments set forth in Plaintiffs memoranda, Defendant * 
Motion is respectfully denied 
Dated this 14 ffday of April 2003 
FRED/) HOWARD 
hstnct Coupt Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
% I certify' that true copies of the foregoing Ruling were delivered on the / day ot Appi 
2003 to the following in the manner indicated, to wit: 
Paul G. Amann 
Craig L. Barlow 
Assistant Attorneys General 
by hand 
Shelden R. Carter 
Attorney for Defendant 
by hand 
Deputy Court Clerk 
